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FEDERAL COURT DOCTRINES IN AVOIDANCE OF ADJUDICATION:
Exhaustion, Abstention and the Anti-Injunction Statute
by Gene R. Shreve, Staff Attorney, Boston Legal Assistance
Project
The federal district court often presents the best
forum in which to raise law reform issues. However,
considerable difficulties may be encountered in convincing
the federal court that it has jurisdiction to act' and that it
should exercise its jurisdiction to decide the merits of the
case. This article will focus upon the second hurdle,
specifically, the federal court doctrines of exhaustion and
abstention and the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283
(1970).
Since each of these doctrines is an expression of
concern over the sensitivity of the state-federal relationship
in federal court litigation, they are most likely to surface
when the federal court defendant is some branch of state or
municipal government, e.g., a welfare department or public
housing authority. This makes the doctrines quite common
to federal poverty law litigation and a source of frustration
to many law reform plaintiffs.
The rules which the courts have laid down have not
always been clearly stated and are subject to numerous
qualifications and exceptions. The doctrines overlap considerably and, as applied by the courts, they are at times
indistinguishable. It is some consolation, however, that the
terrain is equally uncertain on the other side of the
question. As shall be seen below, some plausible basis for
the non-applicability of the doctrines can be argued in most
cases where they are raised.
Exhaustion
Under the exhaustion doctrine, a plaintiff will not be
permitted to institute a federal proceeding without first
pursuing (exhausting) available state remedies. The question
often arises in federal proceedings where a form of state
action is challenged.
Rules limiting the application of the exhaustion
doctrine are fairly clear. Plaintiff is ordinarily not required
to exhaust prior state judicial remedies. 2 This is particularly
true regarding litigation brought under 28 U.S.C. §1343
(1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 Whether state administrative
remedies4 need be exhausted is less certain, but a good
1.
Problems of establishing jurisdiction in the federal courts in
law reform poverty litigation have received considerable attention.

See, e.g., Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 884 (1967), and Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. CIV. LIB.-CIV.
RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1970).
2.
"[W] hen the case becomes appropriate for judicial determination, [plaintiff] may choose whether he wishes to resort to a state
or federal court for such relief." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (West 1970), at 187.See Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).

3.
See Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167,183 (1961).
4.
Some question exists whether plaintiff, in coming to federal
court rather than appealing an administrative determination in state

argument can be made that they need not be-particularly
when the federal court's jurisdiction is invoked to hear civil
rights and federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
By the language in McNeese v.Board of Education,' § 1983
provides "a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to
any remedy any state might have." 6 This can be taken to
mean that the presence of state administrative remedies can
be ignored in §1983 actions and McNeese has been so
interpreted.7 Since it is possible to make a plausible
argument of the existence of a cause of action under § 1983
in lawsuits filed in federal court, 8 the McNeese exception
to the exhaustion doctrine is of great importance. Even
absent this special exception, exhaustion of administrative
remedies cannot be required when resort would be obviously futile, 9 or demonstrably inadequate. Demonstrable
inadequacy of the administrative remedy would include the
likelihood of unreasonable delay, 10 or inaction, 11 when
the result the agency will reach can be clearly shown in

advance. 12
Abstention
Abstention allows a federal court whose jurisdiction
has been properly invoked to postpone decision, pending
trial in a state court, when the result might turn on issues of
state law. 13 The Supreme Court will permit a lower federal
court to abstain only in "limited special circumstances":
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal
Courts sit, human rights under the Federal
Constitution are always a proper subject of
adjudication, and that we have not the right to
decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply
because the rights asserted may be adjudicated
in some other forum. The judge-made doctrine
of abstention, first fashioned in 1941 in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971, sanctions
such escape only in narrowly limited 'special
circumstances.' [Citation omitted.] 14
court, has elected not to exhaust an administrative or a judicial state
remedy. It is established, however, that the absence of a de nova
trial in state court would not ipso facto render the proceeding an
administrative one. Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 US. 134 (1914).
5.
373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
6.
See also, Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); King v.
Smith, 397 U.S. 309,312 n. 4 (1968).
7.
Burnett v. Short, 411 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1971).
8.
See the authorities cited in note 1, supra.
9.
Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
10.
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1920).
11.
Monongahela Connecting R.R. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 373 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1967).
12.
Montana Nat'l Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276
U.S. 499 (1928); Kelly v. Bd. of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (D.C.
Tenn. 1958).
13.
Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's
Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967).
14.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 US. 241, 248 (1967) (emphasis
added).
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Of the "special circumstances" warranting abstention,
the one most frequently relied upon is "the susceptibility
of a state statute of a construction by the state courts that
would avoid or modify the constitutional question" raised
in federal court. 15
There are at least two important limitations on this
"special circumstance." First there must be an ambiguity in
the state law issue before the federal court which is both
real and peculiarly susceptible to resolution by a state
court. When the state law is unambiguous, federal court
abstention ordinarily constitutes reversible error. 16 Second,
the state law ambiguity must be material to plaintiffs'
federal lawsuit.
... it is necessary for the ambiguity to be
'material' in the sense of being relevant to the
possibility of avoiding the constitutional issues.
If the state-law issues are irrelevant to the
constitutional ones, if no possible state-law
decision could destroy the federal questions,
abstention would be futile. Someone will have
to decide the constitutional issues, and since
the federal courts have jurisdiction, they are a
proper forum. 17
A state-law issue is material to the lawsuit only if
plaintiff presents the issue to the court. The fact that a
state-law issue conceivably exists in a given case which
could warrant abstention does no harm to plaintiff if he has
chosen not to raise it in his pleadings. 1a
There are instances when plaintiff will be obliged to
have state law issues touching upon his federal claims tried
in state court. This occurs when the federal court determines that state and federal issues are interwoven and
abstention is warranted on the state court issue. However,
this does not mean that access to an adjudication of federal
issues by a federal district court is foreclosed. In England v.
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 19 the
Supreme Court held that, under certain circumstances, the
plaintiff may limit the state litigation to state issues.
Plaintiff may place upon the state record a reservation that
he is offering only his state issues for an adjudication, that
he is revealing his federal issues merely as a matter of
information, and that he intends to raise those issues
15.
16.

See id. at 248-49.
Chicago v. Atcheson Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77

(1958).
17.

Note, Federal-Question

Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's

Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604, 617 (1967).
See United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (E.D. S.C.

1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
18.
See McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Eng'r, 398 U.S. 281, 295
(1970).
This line of authority may be affected by the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
The Court ordered abstention in a federal suit so that state law
issues raised in a subsequent state proceeding (apparently by
another party), could be resolved. However, the difference afforded
plaintiff in his choice of issues is quite explicitly stated in the
McNeese and A tlantic Coast cases.

19.

375 U.S. 41 (1964).
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subsequently in federal court. This may avoid the effect of
res judicata from an adverse determination of federal issues
by the state court. The problem posed by the state court
determination would have been that it could not be
collaterally attacked in a United States district court
proceeding but would be open only to the possibility of
ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court. 20
The rationale of the England case should be equally
applicable to situations where the plaintiff is obliged to
assert state rights in a state forum, either in advance of or
contemporaneously with a federal suit, in order to preserve
them.
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court required
abstention to allow the Alaska courts to consider a state
law which was unambiguous. However, the Court was
clearly influenced by the fact that the law had been in force
only a short time. 21 The general rule concerning abstention
was restated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case:
As we said in Zwickler v. Koota, abstention
should not be ordered merely to await an
attempt to vindicate the claim in a state court.
Where there is no ambiguity in the state statute,
the federal court should not abstain but should
proceed to decide the federal constitutional

claim.

22

A special abstention problem exists when the relief
sought from a federal court would interfere with a state
criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that since
state interest in criminal prosecutions is particularly strong,
federal courts should not take action interfering with state
criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances. 23 Such circumstances were found to be present
and the lower federal court was ordered not to abstain in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 24 where an injunction was sought
against bad faith state prosecutions commenced subsequent
to the filing of the federal action. However, the Dombrowski exception was considerably narrowed by a series of
Supreme Court cases decided last term. In Younger v.
Harris 25 the Court concluded that possible facial unconstitutionality of a state criminal statute will not justify federal
court intervention to enjoin good faith attempts to enforce
it. Federal court intervention by declaratory judgment in a
similar context was struck down in Samuels v. MacKell. 2
However, the possibility that the abstention doctrine can be
avoided is not foreclosed in cases where state criminal
prosecutions are commenced after the federal suit is
commenced or when state prosecutions are only threatened. 27 The practitioner should be aware of the Court's
20.
See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 198-199.
21.
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 US. 82 (1970).
22.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,439 (1971).
23.
Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 159 (1943).
24.
380 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute held unconstitutional
abridgement of first amendment rights).
25.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
26.
401 U.S. 66 (1971). See also, Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byren v. Karalexis,

401 U.S. 216 (1971).
27.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,54 (1971) (Stewart and
Harlan concurring).

approach in Younger. There, the issue was not framed in
terms of abstention but in terms of the traditional equitable
requirements that plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at
law and establish on the record irreparable harm sufficient
to warrant equitable interference with state criminal proceedings. Although Younger's primary impact may be upon
cases involving state criminal proceedings, 28 plaintiffs'
attorneys should be prepared to meet these arguments
whenever equitable and declaratory relief are sought. 29
The Anti-Injunction Statute
In addition to the judge-made doctrines of abstention
and exhaustion, Congress has created a third obstacle to
adjudication on the merits, a statute deferring to the state
judiciary by barring injunctions against pending state court
lawsuits:
A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments. 30
Section 2283 arguably applies only when relief in the
form of an injunction is sought 31 and then only when the
order sought would necessitate the enjoining of a state
court proceeding initiated prior to the filing of the federal
action. 32 The practical effect of §2283 may be to create a
race to the courthouse.
Timing of the filing of the federal lawsuit is crucial
when §2283 is a factor. If the federal plaintiff permits the
prospective federal court defendant to file in state court
first, the statute becomes an obstacle. However, if the
28.
See id. at 55 n. 2 (Stewart and Harlan concurring).
29.
A factual basis for irreparable harm should be placed in the
record as quickly as possible. In Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200,203
(1971), the Court held that an injunction against a state court
obscenity prosecution unsupported by a finding of irreparable
injury could not stand.
30.
28 U.S.C. §2238 (1970).
31.
Arguably, requests for declaratory relief should be unaffected
by § 2283. See Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602,604 (N.D. Tex.
1969), vacated sub nom. on other grounds Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S.
200 (1971); Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and Declaratory judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1870 (1970).
32.
See the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Harlan in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), and Note, The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 305-308 (1971).
In the event that the federal defendant has initiated some
contact with state court prior to the time the federal lawsuit is filed,
the question of when the state proceeding was instituted becomes
significant. In a criminal context the Supreme Court held in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), that failure of state
authorities to convene a grand jury and secure indictments against
federal plaintiffs prior to the time they filed their complaint in
United States district court meant that there was no state action
pending within the meaning of §2283 at the time the federal action
was instituted. Because the state action in Dombrowski became
pending after the federal action was filed, it was freely enjoinable,
380 U.S. at 484 n. 2. In a civil context, the state court proceeding
probably becomes pending when the state complaint is filed. See
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935).

federal court plaintiff files first and alleges impending or
threatened state court action by the federal defendant, his
standing may be challenged as speculative while it is unsure
whether state court action will actually be commenced and,
if so, what form it will take. 33
Application of §2283 is expressly limited by its own
qualifying language. A federal court may enjoin pending
state court actions (1) "when expressly authorized to do so
by Act of Congress"; (2) "where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction"; or (3) "to protect or effectuate its judgments." The first of these qualifications is significant.
Several lower federal courts have held that actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitute "expressly authorized"
exceptions unaffected by §2283. 34 The remaining two
exceptions have little general application and have been
very narrowly construed in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co. v. Brotherhood of Local Engineers. s
33.
See Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81 (1971). Two cases in
which the timing of filing was successful are Jeanette Rankin
Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 421 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (demonstrators advised by police their planned course of
action violated law), and Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.
Wis. 1971) (plaintiff advised by city attorney that planned action
would lead to prosecution).
34.
See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950);
Baker v. Binder, 272 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D.C. Ky. 1967); Harris v.
Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Cal. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds 401 U.S. 37 (1971). But see, Baines v. Danville, 337 F.2d
579 (4th Cir. 1967).
35.
398 U.S. 281 (1970).

Employment: Revised
Title VII Manual Available
The National Employment Law Project now
has available for distribution its Legal Services Manual
for Title VII Litigation (2nd ed., May 1972). The first
edition of this manual (July 1971) has been outdated
due to the recent Title VII amendments and to
substantial judicial developments under Title VII.
Copies of the second edition are now available free to
Legal Services attorneys and at a cost of $1.50 to all
others. One copy will be sent to each project directly.
Additional copies are available from the Clearinghouse, Clearinghouse No. 5883B or from the National
Employment Law Project.
The National Employment Law Project also has
available for distribution a current summary of recent
public employment discrimination cases, free to Legal
Services attorneys and $.50 to all others.
National Employment Law Project
423 West 118th Street
New York, New York 10027

(212) 866-8591
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